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Abstract/Zusammenfassung/Résumé 
This working paper draws attention to some problematic issues of transitional justice policies as 
promoted by international organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs. It argues that through the 
crystallization of a transitional justice norm on the international level, its institutionalization in 
temporary legal bodies and specialized organizations, and the professionalization of the field, 
transitional justice has become bureaucratized. Drawing on existing critical theoretical and empirical 
literature and on the author’s own extensive field research this working paper deconstructs the 
underlying assumptions and conceptualizations that guide most international transitional justice 
interventions. It identifies some of the conceptual and moral dilemmas that emerge from such 
depoliticized, prescriptive, technocratic and teleological approaches toward post-conflict justice.  
 
Dieses Working Paper lenkt die Aufmerksamkeit auf einige problematische Aspekte von Strategien 
der Übergangsjustiz, wie sie von internationalen Organisationen, bilateralen Geldgebern und NGOs 
gefördert werden. Es argumentiert, dass die Herausbildung einer Norm betreffend Übergangsjustiz 
(Transitional Justice) auf internationaler Ebene, ihre Institutionalisierung innerhalb temporärer 
gerichtlicher Instanzen und spezialisierter Organisationen sowie die Professionalisierung dieses 
Gebietes dazu geführt haben, dass sich Transitional Justice verbürokratisiert hat. Basierend auf 
bestehender kritischer theoretischer und empirischer Literatur und auf den umfangreichen 
Feldforschungen der Autorin dekonstruiert dieses Working Paper die Annahmen und 
Konzeptionalisierungen, die den meisten Interventionen im Bereich Transitional Justice zugrunde 
liegen. Es hebt einige konzeptuelle und moralische Dilemmata solcher entpolitisierten, präskriptiven, 
technokratischen und teleologischen Perspektiven zur Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit im Nachgang 
an Konflikte hervor. 
 
Ce working paper attire l’attention sur quelques aspects problématiques des stratégies de la justice 
transitionnelle telle que promue par les organisations internationales, les bailleurs bilatéraux ainsi 
que les ONG. Il soutient que la cristallisation d’une norme de justice transitionnelle à l’échelle 
internationale, son institutionnalisation à travers des instances juridiques temporaires et 
d’organisations spécialisées ainsi que la professionnalisation du domaine ont contribué à la 
bureaucratisation de la justice transitionnelle. En puisant dans la littérature théorique et empirique 
existante et dans les recherches sur le terrain de l’auteure, ce working paper déconstruit les 
hypothèses et conceptualisations sous-jacentes à la plupart des interventions de justice 
transitionnelle internationale. Il met en avant quelques uns des dilemmes conceptuels et moraux 
inhérents à de telles approches dépolitisées, prescriptives, technocratiques et téléologiques envers la 
justice d’après-guerre. 
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Introduction 
Very few other terms have acquired as much attention in so little time as ‘transitional justice’. As an 
apparent ‘field’ of practice and research it was only consolidated in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
(Bell 2009b), with blurred boundaries separating academics and practitioners. Although the concept 
first emerged amongst human rights advocates, it has been quickly adopted by the peace-building 
community and constitutes today an integral part of the liberal peace-building model (Sriram 2007). 
The liberal peace-building model propagates the promotion of democracy, market-based economic 
reforms and a range of other institutions associated with ‘modern’ states as a driving force for 
building sustainable peace (Newman et al. 2009a). Transitional justice has become an “almost 
automatic response to conflict and human rights violations” (Hazan 2007: 10) and the concept has 
crystallized into an international norm1 (Subotić 2009, Bell 2009a). Bilateral donors, multilateral 
institutions and NGOs mainstreamed it into their activities and specialized desks for transitional 
justice have been created. Transitional justice projects are designed, implemented, monitored and 
evaluated. At least in the last decade transitional justice has been professionalized through the 
recruitment of specialized experts and elaboration of best practice manuals. In parallel, transitional 
justice has become institutionalized and finds its expression in permanent and temporary institutions 
such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR). All of these developments constitute key elements of a trend which I term the 
‘bureaucratization’ of transitional justice. Although I do not deny the many positive aspects of these 
developments, I argue that the current dominant discourse and practice of transitional justice exhibit 
some conceptual pitfalls and problematic outcomes which have only recently started to gain 
attention from critical researchers.  
While becoming institutionalized, professionalized and codified as a norm, transitional justice 
remains largely an under-theorized field (de Greiff 2010). In particular, research has only recently 
started to analyze the long-term changes which advocates of transitional justice claim. 
Consequently, many transitional justice initiatives are based rather on ‘received wisdom’ and causal 
beliefs than on empirically tested hypotheses and correlations (Thoms et al. 2008). Criticisms of 
transitional justice thus include assertions that it relies too heavily on a logic of project management 
which is detached from local political, social, cultural and historical contexts. In addition, critics 
suggest that ‘the local’ is often framed as backwards and traditional, with local actors subject to 
instrumental notions of change which reveal a teleological approach.  
This essay directly engages with such criticisms of transitional justice. Firstly, it will explore how 
transitional justice as currently propagated by multilateral institutions, bilateral donors and 
specialized NGOs has become bureaucratized. Secondly, it will deconstruct the underlying 
assumptions which guide present transitional justice policies and identify some of the conceptual 
and ethical problems inherit in transitional justice interventions. Finally, it will argue that such 
criticisms of the way in which transitional justice is often conceptualized and practiced point to a 
need for greater theorization. The argumentation of this essay is based on an extensive review of the 
increasing critical literature on transitional justice and on my own extensive qualitative field research 
in Burundi conducted between 2009 and 2011. Following a constructivist epistemological approach I 
conducted in-depth interviews and had more informal exchanges with high-ranking politicians, civil 
society representatives, domestic and international experts and ordinary Burundians – the 
‘beneficiaries’. Additionally this essay is inspired by critical work on peace-building (Goetschel and 
Hagmann 2009) as well as on the current debate on ‘fragile states’ (Hagmann and Péclard 2010) at 
swisspeace.  
 
 
______________________ 
1   Throughout this working paper I use the term ‘norm’ not in a legal sense, but rather as it is used in social science. In this 
sense, a norm can be defined as a “standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity” (Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998: 891).  
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1 Bureaucratization of Transitional Justice 
A great deal of literature on transitional justice addresses issues concerning the design of 
transitional justice mechanisms, questions of timing and sequencing and how best to apply 
transitional justice. Thereby scholars often take a normative stance which has heavily influenced the 
development of the literature in this field (Duggan 2010) and the current dominant discourse and 
practice. By focusing for a long time on (mainly) legal mechanisms to deal with a violent past, 
transitional justice was dominated by legal scholars examining “doctrinal issues with reference to 
international criminal law, human rights law, humanitarian law and domestic challenges to 
amnesty” (Bell 2009b: 10). However, a growing body of critical research has recently emerged (cf. 
Palmer et al. 2012, Sriram 2007, Baines 2010, Subotić 2009, Shaw et al. 2010, Vinjamuri and Snyder 
2004). This literature attempts to empirically test the claims of advocates and practitioners (Duggan 
2010) and to question underlying assumptions of the concept of transitional justice. It is to this 
critical literature which this paper speaks, and to which it will contribute.  
Transitional justice can be defined as the “conception of justice associated with periods of political 
change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor 
regimes”2 (Teitel 2003: 69). However, a consensus about what transitional justice is and what the 
concept entails is absent from both the policy and academic arenas. While some authors argue for a 
more narrowly defined concept (e.g. Bell 2009b) focusing on legal aspects, others argue for a thicker 
understanding of transitional justice (e.g.McEvoy 2007). In the practical field a comprehensive and 
commonly agreed upon definition is still lacking to designate the active domain of policy and 
interventions in (post-) conflict societies in order to deal with the legacy of a violent past. 
Throughout the 1990s, international organizations, donor countries, think tanks and specialized 
NGOs developed a plethora of transitional justice definitions in their policies. Some authors and 
policy-makers even use the term ‘dealing with the past’. They argue that ‘transitional justice’ is too 
closely associated with juridical mechanisms and, in contrast, ‘dealing with the past’ would include a 
wide range of activities not limited to a transitional period (cf. Sisson 2010). However, throughout 
this essay I use the term ‘transitional justice’ as it is more widely used by policy makers and 
academics. Moreover, through the broadening of its scope the concept of transitional justice 
includes today many of the same elements as ‘dealing with the past’, such as truth, justice, 
reconciliation, reparations and institutional reforms. Although the definitions of transitional justice 
thus vary in their wording, I argue that importantly the concepts which are promoted by 
international organizations, bilateral donors and specialized NGOs are based on the same 
assumptions and same normative underpinnings, and thus share some key features and disseminate 
a very similar meaning of transitional justice. In the sections which follow I will elaborate on this and 
demonstrate how transitional justice has developed to become ‘justice by bureaucratic means’, 
something which can be applied in any situation or society.  
1.1 Crystallization as an International Norm 
Over the last two decades transitional justice has crystallized as a norm on the international level 
and in international relations. The first initiatives of transitional justice with the involvement of the 
international level were the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials held by the Allied Powers in order to deal 
with the crimes of the German Nazi and Japanese regimes, respectively. As a first phase of 
transitional justice they reflect the “triumph of transitional justice within the scheme of international 
law” (Teitel 2003: 70). The legacy of this interstate cooperation and the criminalization of state 
wrongdoing based on universal rights formed the basis of modern human rights law (Teitel 2003) 
and one legal foundation of the current transitional justice norm. However, those efforts after the 
Second  World  War remained the only judicial  approaches at the international  level until the end of  
 
______________________ 
2   The author notes that transitions from authoritarian regimes towards democracy might be very different from transitions 
from war to peace and would require separate treatment and analysis. However, mainstream transitional justice claims to 
be valid and applicable for both types of transitions.  
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the Cold War. In the meantime, transitions from authoritarian regimes to democracy in Latin 
America have contributed to the development of the transitional justice field from another angle. 
Since legal accountability under these repressive regimes was not possible, international and 
national human rights movements focused on shaming campaigns against human rights violations 
(Arthur 2009). From the 1980s onwards, the focus of the discourse was on human rights issues 
related to political transitions (Arthur 2009: 336). These debates distinguished themselves from the 
previous human rights discourse by adding the normative aim of facilitating a transition to 
democracy (Arthur 2009, Bell 2009b). Truth commissions with the mandate to examine gross human 
rights violations committed by a repressive state emerged as the main instrument of this period. The 
dominant normative lens (to facilitate transitions to democracy) determined which kind of justice 
measures were considered as appropriate and why certain measures were recognized as the 
legitimate justice initiatives during a time of political change (Arthur 2009).  
In parallel, efforts on the international level were undertaken to further develop norms and 
standards to address human rights violations and codify transitional justice in the form of United 
Nations (UN) statements and resolutions as well as various soft law standards (Bell 2009a). These 
efforts also led to the establishment of the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in 1993. The extensive involvement of the High Commissioner in technical assistance 
projects reflects a shift in UN human rights practice from monitoring violations to the building of 
institutions and capacities to facilitate compliance. Against this background Louis Joinet (1997), with 
his principles against impunity, provided a normative framework based on which transitional justice 
has been conceptualized. After the end of the Cold War and with the UN Agenda for Peace (1992), 
transitional justice has broadened its scope. It does not now only cover transitions from 
authoritarian regimes to democracies, but also includes transitions from war to peace. Humanitarian 
law’s requirements concerning post-conflict legal accountability began to be explored and 
developed. For example, in 1995, the International Committee of the Red Cross stated that amnesty 
should be limited to detainees who have not violated international humanitarian law, thus 
interpreting the broadly worded amnesty provision (Article 6(5) of Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions (Bell 2009b). The jurisprudence of the international humanitarian law, in particular by 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), has started to expand its 
applications to situations of internal armed conflict. Transitional justice includes intrastate incidents 
that occur even in peacetime, thus, which are beyond international conflict, focusing on extreme 
offenses such as crimes against humanity (Teitel 2005). In 2000, the UN formalized this normative 
commitment to transitional justice with a set of internal guidelines to its mediators and one year 
earlier through its dissent to the amnesty provision of the Lomé Peace Accord for Sierra Leone (Bell 
2009b). In 2004 this was further reinforced by the UN report on “The rule of law and Transitional 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies” (S/2004/616) and in the UN Guidance Note specifying 
the UN ‘approach towards transitional justice’ (UN Secretary General 2010). 
These developments contributed significantly to the emergence of the transitional justice norm 
based on the normative premise that international humanitarian law, international criminal law and 
human rights law require accountability in post-conflict contexts. Transitional justice has moved 
“from being aspirational to embodying binding legal obligations” (Van Zyl 2005: 209) and has 
evolved from its historically exceptionalist origins to become “something which is normal, 
institutionalized and mainstreamed” (McEvoy 2007: 412). Bell (2009b: 16) states that the concept of 
a coherent field of transitional justice, thus transitional justice as a norm, emerged because 
“international legal norms were argued to be relevant to peacemaking bargains.” International law 
now sets out clear standards regarding state obligations in dealing with past human rights abuses 
and corresponding prohibitions, for example for blanket amnesties for grave crimes. The legally 
characterized codification of standards and principles, various soft law standards, UN resolutions 
and statements all reflect a certain legalism of transitional justice (McEvoy 2007). Based on that, I 
argue that  the dominant  focus of this crystallized  transitional justice  norm lies on  judicial account- 
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ability. Most observers and scholars have viewed internationalized criminal courts as the “gold 
standard” (Ramji-Nogales 2010: 3) for dealing with the past, resulting in the belief that the same 
accountability mechanisms can and should be applied across varied cultures and contexts.  
This, however, has not always gone uncontested and the crystallization has not been as linear and 
uncomplicated as it is often depicted. The peace versus justice debate is probably the best known 
example. Proponents of peace argue that justice would only be possible if there is peace, and, yet, 
justice itself can hinder the achievement of peace (Anonymous 1996, Bell et al. 2004, Sriram and 
Pillay 2009). However, often evoking the obligations of international law and presenting the 
dilemma as a question of timing and sequencing, the debate seems to have reconciled normative 
legal standards with the pragmatics of making peace. Transitional justice has become an “almost 
automatic response to conflict and human rights violations” (Hazan 2007: 10). Among international 
organizations, donors and transitional justice advocates, a consensus seems to have emerged, 
namely that states emerging from conflict have the choice of “how much accountability when” 
rather than between some accountability and none (Bell 2009a: 120). Thus, today it is no longer an 
option whether to deal with the past or not, but rather how, when and which mechanisms to deploy. 
With the crystallization of transitional justice as a norm on the international level, states and 
political leaders responsible for past grave human rights violations can no longer easily avoid their 
responsibility without being at least internationally blamed and depicted as pariahs.  
1.2 Institutionalization of Transitional Justice 
The establishment of transitional justice as an international norm has been accompanied by an 
institutionalization of transitional justice. Firstly, the transitional justice norm and its legal basis, 
including international criminal law, international humanitarian law and human rights law, have 
been further developed, legalized and codified (Subotić 2009) by special bodies. In 1993 and 1994 
respectively, the ICTY and the ICTR were established. With the adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998 
the basis for the creation of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) was laid. As an 
example for the further development of international law, the ICTY has contributed significantly to 
the codification of sexual violence. In a landmark case against Anto Furundžija, the ICTY’s judges 
stated that rape may also be prosecuted as a grave breach of the Geneva Conventions as well as a 
war crime and might be used as a tool of genocide. In 1998, this last aspect was confirmed when 
the ICTR rendered a judgment in the Akayesu case in which it was concluded that rape constitutes 
genocide (website ICTY undated). 
Secondly, specialized (international) NGOs have emerged, such as the Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ) founded in 200. Moreover, international organizations and bilateral donors have created new 
administrative branches or included transitional justice prominently in existing units. For example, in 
2003, the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs created within the Human Security Division 
(HSD) the Task Force Dealing with the Past. By developing a conceptual framework, it mainstreams 
dealing with the past activities in its human security, peace promotion, human rights and 
humanitarian policies. Such new specialized actors and administrative units have increasingly 
invested financially, politically and symbolically in transitional justice (cf. Hazan 2006) by carrying 
out comparative research or training, or supporting politically or symbolically transitional justice 
processes. In particular, international actors have started, since the new millennium, to play a 
greater role in framing approaches to transitional justice (Leebaw 2008). By developing principles of 
‘best practice’ of transitional justice they have actively shaped and contributed to the establishment 
of the transitional justice norm. The institutionalization of transitional justice has also led to the 
opening of new funding schemes. In order to receive funds, humanitarian and peace-building 
organizations have started to place and frame their projects under the heading of transitional justice 
and/or transitional justice has been mainstreamed into existing humanitarian and peace-building 
programs. For local NGOs  and associations  this implies that  they need to adapt their language and  
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label their reconciliation, dialogue or reintegration projects as transitional justice. However, there 
might be a risk that ‘beneficiaries’ and local NGOs only instrumentally and superficially adopt the 
goals of transitional justice policies because they are more interested in the projects’ material 
resources than in their actual aims (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009).  
While this institutionalization of transitional justice in legal edifices, NGOs and administrative bodies 
strengthens accountability for past crimes and the fight against impunity in post-conflict societies, I 
claim that the institutionalization on various levels is a strengthening of a certain transitional justice 
discourse defined by international NGOs, organizations and donor countries. As a consequence some 
concepts and terms, such as reconciliation or justice, have lost some of their flexibility of 
interpretation. For example, in Brčko District in Bosnia and Herzegovina a narrow official 
interpretation of reconciliation as the increased interaction between ethno-national groups does not 
necessarily reflect or incorporate the variety of understandings of reconciliation amongst the 
population (Jones 2012). Below I further discuss the implications of a dominant conceptualization by 
international NGOs, organizations and donor countries.  
1.3 Professionalization of the Field 
Transitional justice has become professionalized with experts, think tanks and researchers engaged 
to consult, design, implement and evaluate transitional justice projects. Wilson (2003: 383) observes 
that a “global reconciliation industry” has sprung up to formulate and implement policies. Thereby 
certain experts define which measures and mechanisms are considered to be appropriate and 
legitimate for a certain context. On the one hand such professionalization ensures that lessons are 
learnt from other contexts, that failures and pitfalls of earlier interventions can be avoided and that 
existing international norms, standards and principles are respected. Consequently, international 
organizations, bilateral donors and specialized NGOs have developed their own transitional justice 
manuals and practical tools based on best practice and lessons learnt in other contexts. Remarkably, 
in collaboration with ICTJ, OHCHR developed a series of rule-of-law tools for post-conflict states on 
the establishment and functioning of truth commissions, reparations, vetting programs and 
prosecution initiatives based on best practices. On the other hand, such professionalization implies 
that a handful of (mainly international) experts decide upon a local transitional justice process and 
the normative conceptualization of justice, reconciliation and peace. As those experts and 
specialized bodies lie mainly in the West and most experts and professionals are Western, the 
transitional justice norm is strongly influenced and dominated by Western values. Also international 
criminal tribunals, through which transitional justice has partly become institutionalized, follow a 
legal tradition of trials and punishment of individual crimes (Tiemessen 2011). Thus, based on a 
liberal tradition of accountability, transitional justice initiatives promote a rather adversarial, 
retributive model of formal legal justice (Lambourne 2009). I will return to this below, when I discuss 
in more detail the moral dilemma which emerges from seeing transitional justice as a political 
process through which parts of the social world are molded. 
A good example of the involvement of experts and their role in a transitional justice process is 
provided by the case of Burundi. The national consultation process on the implementation of 
transitional justice measures in Burundi is strongly influenced by the ICTJ. In 2006 a local NGO asked 
the ICTJ for expert advice on a project to prepare victims for the truth seeking process 
(correspondence on file with author). As a consequence of this query, ICTJ prepared a document 
lobbying the international community and bilateral donors to conduct national consultations (ICTJ 
2008a). When these national consultations finally took place, on behalf of the UN representing the 
international community, a former collaborator of the ICTJ was part of the steering committee. The 
six members of the committee elaborated the questionnaire, conducted the consultation sessions 
and wrote the final report including the recommendations. The presentation of what transitional 
justice is at the beginning of each consultation session was mainly based on the conception of the 
ICTJ. Moreover, the two representatives of the UN on this committee added a disclaimer to the 
question of amnesties: amnesties  cannot be granted for  genocide, war  crimes  and  crimes  against  
Transitional Justice: Justice by Bureaucratic Means? 
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humanity (Comité de Pilotage Tripartite 2010, personal communication with a field assistant 2010). 
This disclaimer officially limited the legitimate measures to deal with those crimes and excluded 
them from amnesty. This issue is still in fact pending in the negotiations on transitional justice 
between the UN and the Burundian government.  
Through the professionalization and the institutionalization of transitional justice in specialized 
NGOs and governmental bodies, transitional justice has become subject to project management 
logic. For example, in the context of Northern Ireland, Bell and others (2004: 7) argue that reforms 
can only be possible when they are “couched in managerialist language, with an emphasis on 
‘professionalism’, ‘efficiency’ and modernisation”. When the state is perceived to have ‘done a good 
job in difficult circumstances’, demands for institutional reform would be seen as a political assault 
on the integrity and neutrality of the legal structure (Bell et al. 2004). By planning, implementing, 
monitoring and evaluating (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009) transitional justice has also become 
rationalized. Transitional justice processes are articulated in log-frames with activities and outputs 
which are supposed to lead to assumed outcomes and impacts which can be evaluated. Comparing 
development and transitional justice, Colvin (2008: 413) argues that both are underlined by the logic 
that with careful planning and proper technique, their goals can be accomplished effectively and 
efficiently. Based on manuals of best practices that are developed by experts, transitional justice is 
elaborated and deployed in projects. However, these manuals depict a rather technocratic, toolbox 
and recipe-like approach to transitional justice characterized by a strong focus on legalism. The focus 
on legal norms further leads to professional demands for lawyers and legal analysis that serve to 
perpetuate the institutional dominance of law and legal approaches to transitional justice (Bell 
2009b). 
Deconstructing Underlying Assumptions Guiding Transitional Justice Interventions 
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2 Deconstructing Underlying Assumptions Guiding 
Transitional Justice Interventions 
As I have argued thus far, based on the emerging transitional justice norm and best practice 
manuals and toolboxes, the great variety of transitional justice initiatives tend to be designed and 
planned by experts and professionals and deployed in projects which can be implemented, 
monitored and evaluated. It is this crystallization of a transitional justice norm and the 
institutionalization and professionalization of the transitional justice field that constitute key 
elements characterizing what I identify as the bureaucratization of transitional justice. Thus 
accountability or justice for past human rights abuses is deployed through bureaucratic means.  
However, these bureaucratic approaches are built on a largely under-theorized (de Greiff 2010) 
understanding of transitional justice or on selective and insufficiently empirically tested assumptions. 
Through the institutionalization of transitional justice ‘vague statements’ and ‘received wisdom’ 
(Goetschel and Hagmann 2009) are produced about what transitional justice is and how the aims of 
it can be achieved. For example, the often stated beneficial nexus between truth-telling and 
reconciliation remains on a conceptual level rather than being based on an empirically established 
correlation. The beneficial effects of truth telling might only be based on a moral conviction (Brahm 
2007) or arise from often repeated aspirational statements (Borer 2006). Borer (ibid: 30) writes that 
the “particular linking of two concepts – truth and reconciliation – has been reiterated so often that 
it has achieved the status of a truism.” Especially regarding the effects and impacts of transitional 
justice, research has only recently started to analyze long term changes (Thoms et al. 2008). 
Consequently, many transitional justice initiatives are based rather on ‘received wisdom’ and causal 
beliefs than on empirically tested hypotheses and correlations (ibid.). 
If we again take the example of Burundi we can see how perceptions of which transitional justice 
mechanisms are needed can be complicated. When Burundians were asked in national consultations 
on transitional justice ‘what is needed for reconciliation?’ 83 percent mentioned justice. However, 
‘truth’ (91%) and also ‘forgiveness’ (87%), which is often associated with amnesties and framed as 
the opposite of justice (cf. Hamber 2007), are perceived to be even more needed for reconciliation 
(Comité de Pilotage Tripartite 2010). In the open question category, people then mentioned 
prerequisites for reconciliation and the non-recurrence of violence such as dialogue, civil and 
patriotic education and equal and sustainable economic development. Such aspects are usually not 
explicitly part of transitional justice policies, or at least not in the case of Burundi where it consists of 
a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a special criminal tribunal. Thus, Burundians consider 
other aspects than justice conductive to reconciliation, and consequently seem to implicitly challenge 
the transitional justice assumption that justice is needed for reconciliation. 
The discourse promoted by transitional justice advocates suggests various such interpretations about 
reality and causal mechanisms, which are then presented as factual evidence. Rather than 
hypotheses derived from narrowly defined scientific theories, they are, however, vaguely stated 
assumptions. The following part deconstructs some of these underlying assumptions that guide 
present transitional justice policies and identifies some of the conceptual and ethical problems 
inherit in transitional justice interventions. 
2.1 Depoliticization 
A widespread assumption is that transitional justice will be accepted as a legitimate and (value-) 
neutral tool, since it is guided by and based on international norms and standards. Underlying this 
assumption is the belief in the universality of those norms and standards, such as human rights. Due 
to their externality, they are perceived to be immune to local power struggles and political 
instrumentalization (Leebaw 2008). Such a ‘neutral’ and technocratic approach might be appealing 
in a highly politically polarized and stalled context. However, the vague definitions of transitional 
justice and undefined substance of its goals of truth, justice and reconciliation make the policies and 
concepts  susceptible to  misuse and  manipulation by powerful local or international actors. In these  
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cases, transitional justice advocates speak of politicized (transitional) justice; justice is used for 
political aims. The ICTJ states that “without any truth-telling or reparation efforts […] punishing a 
small number of perpetrators can be viewed as a form of political revenge. Truth-telling, in isolation 
from efforts to punish abusers and to make institutional reforms, can be viewed as nothing more 
than words. Reparations that are not linked to prosecutions or truth-telling may be perceived as 
"blood money" - an attempt to buy the silence or acquiescence of victims” (ICTJ 2009).  
However, I challenge the perceptions of ‘politicized’ justice that transitional justice advocates put 
forward when transitional justice becomes subject of local political struggles. In contrast, I argue 
that in doing so transitional justice advocates deny the inherent political nature of the process. 
Hence, it seems that transitional justice has become depoliticized. This depoliticization of 
international interventions is in line with the increasing judicialization of conflicts and legal 
approaches toward conflict resolution. Law, especially international law, is perceived as a “safe, 
neutral, universal way to engage with other countries” (Oomen 2005: 893). The legalist lens that 
transitional justice takes limits the focus to specific sets of actors for specific sets of crimes 
committed within a rather artificial period of time, and thus determines the categories of when, to 
whom and for what transitional justice applies (Nagy 2008). Consequently the transitional justice 
norm frames the particular kind of solutions and the particular kind of problems it aims to address 
(ibid.). Thereby this framing occurs in an apolitical way and judicial means are considered to be the 
appropriate and legitimate way to resolve the problems framed in a legalist way. Wide ranging 
political questions are translated into more narrowly framed legal questions (Robins 2012). As some 
(Nagy 2008, McEvoy 2007) highlight, the problem is not with law or human rights per se, but rather 
with their over emphasis in the approach of the transitional justice norm and the depoliticized way 
in which ‘justice’ is supposed to operate.  
Due to claims of the universality of human rights and the neutrality of law, normative narratives of 
transitional justice regard transitions as inherently positive and as requiring no further elucidation 
(Dube 2011). Within the norm of transitional justice, transitions are equalized with positive 
outcomes (ibid) without really asking what the content is of ‘doing good’. Avoiding the thorny 
normative question of whether a transitional justice intervention and the goals promoted are ‘good’ 
or ‘bad’, transitional justice initiatives promote a rather technical and depoliticized approach. 
Although transitional justice advocates claim to promote, at least not explicitly, less political goals, 
transitional justice mechanisms judge political violence and therefore are implicated in political 
judgments (Leebaw 2008). For example, the goal of reconciliation was reformulated in apolitical 
terms. While reconciliation used to refer to political compromises and bargains to stabilize the new 
regime, today it pertains rather to consensus (ibid). Thus, transitional justice is not a value-neutral 
tool, but instead an inherently political process. The normative and political concepts underlying 
transitional justice initiatives are related to popular identity, local and global power relations and 
contested conceptions of justice and the organization of the social world (Goetschel and Hagmann 
2009). Teitel (2002: 385) even argues that “law itself can define what constitutes peace and stability 
internationally, and further that it could somehow displace politics to resolve international 
conflicts.” But the normative goals of transitional justice including the conceptualization and 
understanding of justice, reconciliation and peace, are only rarely deliberated and discussed with 
those at whom the intervention is target. Instead the concepts of liberal peace-building and 
democratic peace theory are rather uncritically endorsed, despite the growing body of critical 
literature on liberal peace-building and the promotion of democracy (cf. Newman et al. 2009b, 
Sriram 2007). 
2.2 External Engineering of Reconciliation, Democracy and Peace 
Reliant on technocratic and project logic approaches, it is presumed that the aims of transitional 
justice, such as reconciliation, rule of law, democracy and peace, can be externally engineered. It is 
also assumed that the ‘right’ set of institutions and the ‘appropriate’ mix of processes, with a few 
changes,  can  be applied  to any  and all  situations and  countries  (Thoms et al. 2008).  They will be  
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successful as long as one possesses adequate knowledge to determine which intervention to deploy 
(cf. Fletcher et al. 2009), has local partners and financial means. This assumption often translates 
into a ‘toolbox’ approach from which the appropriate combination for the intervention has to be 
chosen. “A distinguishable transitional justice template has emerged involving possible prosecutorial 
styles of justice […], local mechanisms for truth recovery, and a programme for criminal justice 
reform in previously conflicted societies.” (McEvoy 2007: 412). Underlying this assumption is a 
certain perception of what a transition is. Drawing largely on an article by Arthur (2009), I claim that 
this perception has led to the definition of the ‘legitimate’ mechanisms resulting in a ‘toolbox’ 
approach. Arthur (ibid) claims that the conceptual content of transitional justice has directly been 
shaped by a set of interactions among human rights activists, lawyers and legal scholars, 
policymakers, donors and comparative politics experts. They largely understood transitions to 
democracy in the 1970s and 1980s in terms of political reform, rather than social transformation, 
thus, they were construed as taking place primarily at the legal-institutional level of politics (ibid.). 
Judicial accountability measures, truth commissions, restitution or reparation, and reform of state 
institutions – have become recognized as the legitimate set of measures. Underlying the 
development of a ‘toolbox’ is a particular understanding of transitions toward democracy as a 
“shortened ‘sequence’ of elite bargaining and legal-institutional reforms rather than through long-
term socioeconomic stages” (ibid: 338).  Social change is considered to be an outcome of legal-
institutional reforms and hence, transitional justice is often externally imposed in a paternalistic and 
top-down way (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009).  
Due to the focus on legal-institutional reforms, the ‘toolbox’ approach towards transitional justice is 
a typically state-centered and state-driven process. It organizes itself conceptually and politically 
along the lines of the nation-state (Colvin 2008). Critics have suggested that this approach often 
ignores or neglects local realities, historical developments and social, economic and political 
conditions. Roht-Arriaza (2006: 2) states that “a narrow view [of transitional justice] can be 
criticized for ignoring root causes and privileging civil and political rights over economic, social and 
cultural rights”. Justice is not a thing in and of itself, simply delivered and engineered by specific 
transitional justice mechanisms and institutions, but rather justice is a social project (Baines 2010). 
In the rush to advance transitional justice initiatives, donors, NGOs and international organizations 
may overlook the context (and its limitations) in which their interventions will unfold (Fletcher et al. 
2009). As transitional justice aims at transforming the social and political circumstances which led to 
gross human rights violations, it requires in-depth contextual knowledge. Perceptions about what 
should be transformed must be shared with local stakeholders and approaches must be adapted to 
specific contexts in order to enjoy the necessary legitimacy at the local level. But partly due to time 
constraints and managerial rationality of transitional justice policies only few efforts are made to 
conceptualize local understandings of justice and reconciliation. Little is invested in exploring 
existing informal conflict resolution mechanisms, customary law, religious and kinship institutions. 
The lack of context knowledge is mostly substituted with expert knowledge (Goetschel and 
Hagmann 2009). It is often based on ‘received wisdom’ and assumed causal beliefs about 
transitional justice or ‘experts’ simply evoke international norms and standards without linking them 
to the context. Thereby external ‘expert’ knowledge is considered to be superior and trumps popular 
and indigenous conceptions about how to deal with the past.  
Despite claims and assertions for context-specific approaches rather than one-size-fits-all formulas, 
and for regarding transitional justice as a political question rather than a set of merely technical 
decisions (cf. UN Secretary General 2004), transitional justice mechanisms have all too often been 
introduced without regard for the internal dynamics of the society for which they were intended 
(Hazan 2006), and thus are “abstract from lived realities” (Nagy 2008: 279) in a way which “may be 
alien and distant to those who actually have to live together after atrocity” (ibid: 275). For example, 
criminal courts rely on a concept of individualized guilt, which is an integral element of justice, and a 
clear separation between victims and perpetrators (Buckley-Zistel 2009). However, this may not 
resonate with local contexts and conceptions of guilt because guilt is not only individual but instead 
embedded in a collective social and political  context (ibid). Where  there were exceptions and efforts  
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to include local realities and consider local perceptions and participation, such good intentions often 
fall prey to managerial efficiency and rationality criteria when it comes to implementation. The 
normative content and the desirability of the aims of transitional justice are seldom subject to 
discussion with local actors. When people, ‘beneficiaries’ and target groups are consulted, this is 
done only with regards to project implementation. For example, in Burundi the population was able 
to express its opinion in national consultations mainly on the implementation modalities and the 
technical aspects of the truth and reconciliation commission and the special tribunal (cf. Comité de 
Pilotage Tripartite 2010). While the consultations provide a semblance of participation, political 
questions were not addressed and the population could not participate in the designing and 
planning of the transitional justice project in Burundi. Hence, the majority of the population has 
been excluded from defining what justice, reconciliation and peace mean in the Burundian context.  
The paternalistic imposition of transitional justice models that are detached from the local political, 
historical, social or cultural context may result in contestation and rejection of, as well as resistance 
to, transitional justice. However, transitional justice is rarely a democratic process. Often provisions 
of transitional justice are set in peace negotiations between armed groups, political parties, 
governments and international actors. Victims are among the primary beneficiaries (Sisson 2010), 
but they are mostly excluded from the planning and designing of transitional justice processes and 
almost never represented in peace negotiations. This leads us to ask in what ways ‘the local’ is 
imagined and targeted as part of transitional justice.  
2.3 Conceptualization of ‘The Local’ 
The UN (UN Secretary General 2004: 12) recognizes that “due regard must be given to indigenous 
and informal traditions for administering justice or settling disputes, to help them to continue their 
often vital role and to do so in conformity with both international standards and local tradition”. 
Initially, traditional mechanisms and customary law were viewed as complements to non-
prosecutorial transitional justice mechanisms, able to afford them increased legitimacy (Shaw et al. 
2010). Earlier transitional justice efforts were conceptualized by the relegation of restorative justice 
to the periphery of local communities and by the international community’s mainstay of retributive 
justice (Tiemessen 2011). Thus, local and domestic mechanisms were associated with a more 
restorative approach to justice, while international mechanisms or domestic mechanisms fully 
corresponding to the transitional justice norm follow a rather retributive approach. However, the 
conceptualization of local justice as being exclusively restorative has been criticized by several 
authors as there is no straightforward correlation between retributive justice as international and 
cosmopolitan and restorative justice as domestic and communitarian (ibid). The distinction between 
retributive justice as in western formal legal systems and restorative justice as in indigenous, 
informal justice mechanisms is oversimplified and serves to mask multiple, complex human needs, 
expectations and experiences related to dealing with the past and reconciliation (Lambourne 2009). 
While today this false distinction between the local as restorative and the international as retributive 
has increasingly been acknowledged (cf. ibid), transitional justice initiatives that take into account 
local mechanisms for administering justice and settling disputes frequently follow a level-based 
approach. However, such level-based approaches are conceptualized in a dichotomous manner in 
which the ‘local’ is constructed as a category that is separated from the ‘international’ or ‘global’ 
and in which each realm is somehow distinct and discrete from each other (Baines 2010).  
There exists a plethora of studies on local, traditional or customary mechanisms (e.g.Huyse and 
Salter 2008), but many of these studies focus on and provide insights into principles of customary 
practices with a concern for how they (can) contribute to national-level transitional justice 
mechanisms or reconciliation processes (Baines 2010). Following on from the UN’s postulate that 
local mechanisms should be taken into account in conformity with international standards it means 
that local mechanisms and perceptions are only considered as long as they resonate with 
international norms and standards. If local mechanisms resemble Western courts and customary 
laws or can be adapted  to meet ‘universal’ standards (Baines 2010), they  are perceived to be appro- 
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priate and worthy of funding from donors. This implies that global efforts and initiatives precede 
local particularities (Finnström 2010) and suggests a certain superiority of international approaches. 
In contrast, if local actors and local mechanisms do not share the donors’ geopolitical worldviews 
(Goetschel and Hagmann 2009), they are deliberately excluded on the grounds of moral 
backwardness or a lack of modernity. For example, after a controversy regarding the execution of 22 
convicted ‘génocidaires’ in 1998, Rwanda imposed a de facto moratorium on carrying out death 
sentences and eventually abolished the death penalty in 2007 in order to persuade foreign states 
and in particular the ICTR to extradite suspects to trials in Rwanda (cf. Waldorf 2009). Without the 
moratorium and the abolition, the Gacaca system which was established in 2002 would most likely 
not have been supported by international organizations and bilateral donors, not at least because it 
might violate standards of due process (Tiemessen 2004).  
Debates about localizing transitional justice are often framed in reference to the virtues of 
‘modernity’ which are supposedly represented by international or formal justice versus those of 
‘tradition’ supposedly represented by local justice (Shaw et al. 2010), resulting in the 
conceptualization of ‘the local’ as pre-modern and remote. As traditional approaches are often 
analyzed against the backdrop of international norms they may be considered to be informal and 
illegitimate in opposition to formal, legitimate and ‘modern’ mechanisms promoted by the 
transitional justice norm (Baines 2010). This ‘mismatch’ between a traditional or customary based 
approach and international norms and standards may lead to the discrediting of local practices of 
redress altogether, to the delegitimization of some transitional justice strategies in favor of others 
(Tiemessen 2011) or to the marginalization of the experiences, understanding and priorities of 
people living in a certain ‘local’ space (Shaw 2008 cited in Baines 2010). For example, the proposed 
formalization of Acholi reconciliation rituals into Ugandan law is somehow based on a perception 
that the North is less ‘developed’ and people have “their primitive justice measures, whereas those 
in the South have modern ones”. This “socially infantilizes the North” (Allen 2007: 160). 
Transitional justice initiatives that take into account traditional approaches, I argue, reveal a certain 
depiction of ‘the local’. ‘The local’ is often equated or even conflated with ‘traditional’ and 
‘customary’, in return ‘the customary’ or ‘traditional’ is frequently perceived to be a self-evident 
property of ‘the local’. (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). Based on this conflation and equalization, claims 
of more legitimacy and acceptance of traditional mechanisms are made on the grounds of 
‘authenticity’, ‘tradition’ and ‘communitarianism’ (Betts 2005). However, ‘the local’ is not defined by 
traditional mechanisms and customary law alone, rather justice is a social project among many 
others (Baines 2010). The overwhelming emphasis on customary law may deflect attention away 
from other locally based practices of redress and conflict resolution (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). Local 
contexts and actors are not static, fixed or homogenous; instead they are heterogeneous, dynamic 
and changing. What the local context is and how it relates to transitional justice cannot be simply 
answered beforehand by an ethnographic study, but the relevant local context for transitional justice 
interventions is emergent out of the engagement between external and internal actors (Colvin 
2008). The ‘local’ and the ‘national’ are defined by disputes over values, practices, memories and 
efforts to remake the social world (Leebaw 2008, Colvin 2008) and may even be an ‘invention of 
tradition’ by local elites (Allen 2007). Hence, purely ‘nationally owned’ processes may not be per se 
more sensitive to the ‘local’ than processes that involve the international level. Moreover, inherent in 
transitional justice initiatives is also a certain depiction of the ‘local’ past. Following a thread of 
‘purity’ (Colvin 2008), transitional justice efforts sometimes display the desire to recover lost worlds, 
essences or to build new ones that meet some of an ideal which surfaces in the language of 
‘reconstruction’, ‘healing’ and ‘restoring’ (ibid.). Such vocabulary implies a return to a harmonious 
status quo ante (Betts 2005) and depicts a rather idealized peaceful past society which might not 
recently, or indeed ever, have existed in this idealized form.  
I argue therefore that ‘the local’ and ‘traditional or customary mechanisms’ are always constructed 
as a function of goals and perceptions of involved actors. For example, the current Gacaca courts are 
not the original – ‘traditional’ – Gacaca  which did  not use  trials (Betts 2005). While in the more tra- 
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ditional version Gacacas were voluntary, inter-familial and sanctions were enforced by social 
pressure and directed exclusively towards the restoration of social harmony, the modern version is 
backed by the state and can involve a prison sentence for the guilty person (Betts 2005). Hence, 
local practices are adapted to varying degrees concerning their meaning and level of formality. 
Customary law and local norms are not “a stable body of fixed rules, but rather a set of changing 
practices” (Shaw and Waldorf 2010: 15). Moreover, local contexts, justice systems and norms have 
been and are shaped by colonial remodeling, imported influences, international expectations, 
modernization, social control, or elite manipulation (ibid., Lambourne 2009). Notwithstanding the 
remoteness of some places from metropolitan centers, it would be hard to find a place now that is 
not pervaded by circulations of ideas and images from international human rights NGOs, externally 
funded religious institutions, vehicles of international interventions, national political campaigns or 
networks of migrants and diaspora groups (Shaw and Waldorf 2010). Thus, no location in the world 
exists in complete detachment from national and global processes. Therefore, a broader range of 
ideas, practices and processes need to be explored, including those borrowed and reconfigured from 
elsewhere, those developed through exchange with actors beyond the immediate locale and those 
that emerged from performances of everyday life to (re-)make relationships (ibid). Hence, in 
transitional justice, one should be aware of the fact that an idealized peaceful ‘traditional’ past 
might never have existed and that traditions may “no longer exist or have been used, misused and 
transformed by entrepreneurs of violence” (Pouligny 2005: 20).  
2.4 Instrumentalist Understanding of Actors 
Underlying the bureaucratized approaches towards transitional justice that are deployed in a project 
management and technocratic logic is a rather instrumentalist understanding of local actors, social 
relations and target groups. Underlying the depoliticized transitional justice model lies the premise 
that “societies can be understood and manipulated, and people will behave rationally or at least 
predictably” (Colvin 2008: 423). Derived from a legalistic definition as “the ethical attitude that 
holds that moral conduct is to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to consist of 
duties and rights determined by rules” (Shklar 1964: 1 cited in Vinjamuri and Snyder 2004), it is 
assumed that the behavior of actors is guided by norms. Transitional justice mechanisms would 
function according to their prescription and would not be manipulated, adapted or filtered by local 
actors. However, local actors, including civil society organizations, victims, perpetrators, bystanders, 
local elites and political parties, are not passive and recipient subjects, but rather actively adapt, use, 
manipulate, and shape transitional justice interventions and policies. Moreover, people do not 
always act rationally and behaviours are difficult to predict in advance. While law on the one hand 
has the capacity to regulate violent behavior and expose arbitrary state powers, on the other hand it 
represents also a way of conceptualizing and articulating how we would like the social world to be 
(McEvoy 2007). In this sense, transitional justice has the capacity to arbitrate about the past in 
relation to individual guilt and institutional responsibility. It can deny and reject or affirm and 
support certain past political practices and versions of the past (Bell 2009b). It is mainly in the field 
of politics in which we decide about the organization of a society and how and which norms and 
perceptions will become legally binding institutions or regimes. Hence, transitional justice is an 
inherently contested political process.  
In spite of the declarations and efforts of participatory approaches to “respect and support local 
ownership, local leadership and local constituency for reform” (UN Secretary General 2004: 7), 
transitional justice promoted by international organizations, bilateral donors and specialized NGOs is 
highly prescriptive. Due to time constraints and managerial rationality of transitional justice policies 
few efforts are made to conceptualize local understandings of justice and reconciliation. Baines 
(2010) observes that the field of study and practice only rarely starts with local knowledge. Based on 
international norms and standards, transitional justice policies reproduce a problematic ‘division of 
labour’ (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009). The global North, represented by international 
organizations, donor states and specialized NGOs, defines and finances transitional justice projects, 
while the global South is supposed to absorb and implement them.  
Deconstructing Underlying Assumptions Guiding Transitional Justice Interventions 
  15 
 
To enhance local participation and local ownership of transitional justice strategies, the international 
community perceives that this can be best handled by civil society organizations, and they are 
assumed to be the ideal vehicles for delivering reconciliation (Pankhurst 1999). Pankhurst (ibid: 246) 
claims that new organizations are established with the aim of mediating tensions within 
communities or old organizations are sometimes revived and given new meaning. Transitional 
justice advocates believe in the need to strengthen and involve civil society for a better acceptance 
and legitimacy of transitional justice interventions. Underlying this belief is the assumption that civil 
society naturally represents the population’s needs and concerns. Supposedly representing the needs 
and concerns of victims, victim associations enjoy a special status due to the premise of victim-
centered transitional justice mechanisms (Sisson 2010). However, the concept of civil society is much 
disputed. In contrast to widely held beliefs, civil society organizations are “often urban based, 
operate in a top-down manner and are not necessarily democratically organised, nor do they always 
maintain cross-ethnic relations” (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009: 63). An example from Burundi 
illustrates this point. With the first multi-party elections in 1993 and the victory of a Hutu party, the 
members of the former Tutsi-dominated single party needed to find space other than the political 
institutions through which they could make their claims heard. Many former Tutsi politicians 
founded their own civil society organizations such as AC Genocide which mobilize an ethnicized 
discourse.3 Pankhurst (1999: 247) specifies that simply because civil society organizations “exist 
outside the control of the state does not guarantee that they embody any qualities of morality or 
concern for the greater good, an erroneous assumption which is often made by outsiders who work 
with a simplistic notion of civil society as merely the sum of associational life.” Partly based on this 
conceptualization of a ‘good’ civil society is the assumption that there would be a demand from 
‘below’, from the population and from local civil society organizations for accountability in post-
conflict contexts. However, Subotić (2009: 7) rightly challenges this assumption that states will 
adopt international justice models just because their domestic constituencies will demand it. 
2.5 Teleological Approach Towards Transitional Justice 
A fundamental belief which underlies most policies is that transitional justice is a necessary and 
purposeful development on the way to the construction of a liberal society and the establishment of 
the rule of law and a democratic state. This teleological approach of transitional justice assumes that 
all countries will, or should, converge in the long run towards a liberal democratic state. Expressed 
in this idea is a linear continuum from a weak conflict state to a strong peaceful state. Thus, all post-
conflict states would, with the right and appropriate means including transitional justice, converge 
towards a liberal democracy according to the Western model. In contrast, violence is associated with 
moral backwardness and a lack of modernity (Goetschel and Hagmann 2009). Based on the focus on 
international law, transitional justice underlies the “paradigm of transition from a less liberal (more 
violent) context, to a more liberal (less violent) one. The projected end-goal is thus some form of 
liberal-democratic state” (Bell et al. 2004: 3). In line with the increasing judicialization of post-
conflict situations, the current international enthusiasm might be understood as part of a broader 
attempt to create a new world order of liberal democracies in which politics is forever deferred and 
history comes to an end (Orford 2006). Thereby states are being produced as reliable subjects of the 
capitalist democratic order (ibid). Most transitional justice initiatives privilege a liberal paradigm of 
civil and political rights through an emphasis on procedural democracy, constitutionalism and the 
rule of law (Gready 2005). For example, by neglecting the systematic economic abuses and the 
legacies of inequality and poverty, the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
contributed to providing an enabling context for free markets (ibid).  
 
______________________ 
3   AC Genocide was established following the massacres of Tutsis in 1993 and thus can be considered as a victim group. In 
an ethnicized discourse, it advocates for a strong ‘punitive justice’ (personal communication , October 2010) for the Tutsi 
victims by framing the massacres as a genocide against the Tutsi committed by Hutu, irrespective of the fact that the civil 
war also cost many lives of Hutu. 
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Such teleological approaches to transitional justice and peace-building reveal a paradox that 
countries emerging from violent conflicts are not only dangerous in their ‘non-modernity’ but are 
also ‘blank slates’. This implies that post-conflict societies represent a social and political vacuum 
from which it is relatively easy to engineer the goals of transitional justice, including reconciliation, 
democracy and peace (Cramer 2007). However, “there is no tabula rasa society” (Fletcher et al. 
2009: 209) in which transitional justice can simply be implemented and thus lead to the emergence 
of a liberal democratic state. Instead, “context matters and it matters considerably” (ibid: 209). 
According to Shaw and Waldorf (2010: 11) the teleological assumptions of transitional justice are 
based on dominant ideas about “the proper work of speech and memory, models of personhood, 
and understandings of damage, social repair, and redress”. However, such dominant concepts are 
mainly inspired by Western conceptualizations and scholars. For example, the empowering, 
redemptive and apotropaic powers of speaking and remembering – one of the major premises of 
truth commissions – were forged by Western religious and psychological thought (Shaw 2007). 
These teleological approaches of transitional justice propagate a Western inspired model of justice 
(Lambourne 2009). The aims and substance of transitional justice are uncontested and essentially 
given, and transitional justice initiatives rather uncritically endorse the concept of liberal peace-
building and democratic peace theory according to which post-conflict states will emerge as liberal 
democratic states with the help of transitional justice interventions. An empirical finding, although 
based on an inverted logic, is provided by Fletcher and others (2009). They find that in states “where 
there is strong rule of law, democracy, and a negotiated political settlement, the global community 
will respect the decisions of these governments to choose the substance, timing, and sequencing of 
transitional justice interventions” (ibid: 217). Consequently, if states are closer on the continuum to 
liberal democracies, the necessity for an intervention seems to be less immediate. 
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Conclusion 
This critical essay has explored the transitional justice policies of multilateral organizations, bilateral 
donors and specialized NGOs. I have argued that generally, they propagate a conception of 
transitional justice according to which its goals including justice for past human rights abuses can be 
achieved by bureaucratic means. Thus reconciliation, rule of law, democracy and peace can be 
externally engineered. As a policy, transitional justice follows a managerial logic where projects 
need to be planned, implemented, monitored and evaluated. Although promoters of transitional 
justice are increasingly talking in terms of adapting policies to the local context, the normative 
content of their transitional justice policies are rarely actually discussed with local actors. By 
avoiding the difficult discussion about what justice and reconciliation mean in certain contexts, 
transitional justice is thus depoliticized and appears as an uncontested idea. Following a teleological 
logic, this transitional justice conception promotes a Western inspired model of justice. If local 
mechanisms do not resonate with a liberal tradition of accountability, they are considered to be 
second-best, illegitimate or backward. Transitional justice policies are devoted to establishing a 
liberal democratic state according to examples from the global North. 
These critical reflections are not intended to suggest that transitional justice is not desirable, nor 
that is has no good effects or outcomes. Nor is the universality of global norms questioned; human 
rights are applicable in any part of the world. However, the uncomfortable feeling of some actors in 
the global South towards ‘global’ norms and standards may stem, among other reasons, from the 
fact that not everybody is contributing equally to their development and codification. Moreover, 
resistance grows out of the double standard in applying them. Therefore, claims to consider local 
contexts, perceptions and participation should be taken seriously. ‘Beneficiaries’, focal groups and 
local actors should be involved as an equal party in the planning and designing of transitional justice 
and not only in the implementation phase of policies.  
Finally, these critical reflections should encourage academics to address the fact of under-
theorization and to conduct research challenging the normative and underlying assumptions of 
transitional justice. More knowledge about effects and impacts is needed, but also on the causal 
beliefs and assumptions underlying transitional justice. Researchers can also provide more insights 
into the perceptions, understandings and conceptualizations of transitional justice at the local level. 
Such studies could inform policies by multilateral organizations and governmental donors. 
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List of Abbreviations 
HSD Human Security Desk 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICTJ International Center for Transitional Justice 
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
NGO  Non-governmental organization 
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights 
UN United Nations 
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